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Corporate boardroom processes and board composition ha

topics of interest and debate for both organizational researcher
tioners. In recent years, however, criticism of corporate board
dramatically, as evidenced by the comments of former Inter

phone & Telegraph chairman, Harold Geneen. According to

boards of directors of U.S. industry include numerous first-rat
what amounts to a second-rate job" (1984: 258). In defense of hi
brought up many points, but board composition is the most
argument. Essentially, Geneen and other critics have argued th
of corporate boards restrict their members' independence and

ineffective when it comes to monitoring top management a

stockholders' interests (Anshen, 1980; Drucker, 1973; Mace, 197
1983).
The reform that critics of boardroom processes most frequ
involves increased representation by outsiders, directors who a
bers of management. According to these advocates, a higher
outside members strengthens a board's independence and br

of power and knowledge. What is perplexing, however, is t

accepted as common knowledge and adopted in the rules and re

various stock exchanges and government agencies, this posi

virtually untested. Thus, despite a clear trend in U.S. firms tow
outside representation (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc. 1979, 1980: H
Korn/Ferry International, 1981; National Association of Corpor
1982; Securities and Exchange Commission, 1980; Smith, 1978; V
we still do not know if organizations with greater proportions
on their boards are more effective in terms of serving stockhold

companies dominated by insiders.

This study was funded in part by a grant from the Business Foundation of
Inc.
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OUTSIDER DOMINANCE PERSPECTIVE

The name frequently given to this strategy for boardroom re

outsider dominance perspective. According to supporters of

outsiders should be in the majority on corporate boards, becaus

greater breadth of knowledge and experience (Bacon & Brown, 1973;
Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1980; Securities and Exchange Commission, 1980;
Williams & Shapiro, 1979). More important, advocates of this position consider outsiders a vital board resource because of two issues-independence,
and the dual roles of many chief executive officers (CEOs) (Berg & Smith,
1978).
In over 75 percent of large U.S. firms, the CEO serves simultaneously as
board chairman (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc. 1981; Korn/Ferry International,

1981; National Association of Corporate Directors, 1982). Yet, despite its

prevalence, this arrangement has met with severe criticism for two reasons.
First, it represents a conflict of interests. According to Geneen, "the board's

responsibility is to sit in judgment on the management, especially on the
performance of the chief executive, and to reward, punish, or replace the
management as the board ... sees fit" (1984: 252). The chief executive, on
the other hand, is a professional manager. Geneen's point is that chairmen/
CEOs cannot represent the shareholders in the first role and at the same time
impartially sit in judgment on their own performance in the second role.
In agreement with Geneen is former Securities and Exchange Commission

(SEC) chairman, Harold Williams. According to Williams, the chairman and
CEO perform two very different roles. It is a CEO's job to speak on behalf of
management, but it is a chairman's job to question management (Williams &

Shapiro, 1979). Palmieri (1979) also agreed, noting that a board chairman
should strive to create an environment where questioning and in-depth dis-

cussion are valued. A CEO, however, despite appreciating the board's
function, wants to "get the meeting finished so the organization can get on

with its business" (1979: 48).
A second problem brought on by unitary leadership is that it forces
inside or management directors into an uncomfortable position. As noted, it

is a board's responsibility to monitor management's performance. Consequently, insiders are being asked to evaluate the individual who on a day-today basis acts as their boss. Supporters of outsider dominance suggest that
outside directors, because of their independence, can better serve the interests of stockholders. Unlike their inside counterparts, who are a CEO/chairman's subordinates, outsiders can freely evaluate management's performance
and act to remedy inappropriate or unacceptable situations.
Strongly backed by advocates of boardroom reform, the notion of outsider dominance has received support from other sources as well. Beginning

in the late 1960s, for example, both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and American Stock Exchange (ASE) ruled that all firms listed on the
exchanges must have a minimum of two outside board members (Securities

and Exchange Commission, 1980).
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Also during this time, Williams, then chairman of the SEC, actively
promoted a more stringent proposal, suggesting that outsiders and CEOs be
the sole members of boards (Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1980; Securities and
Exchange Commission, 1980; Vance, 1983). Recently, there has been renewed

interest in this proposal (Anshen, 1980; Geneen, 1984). Although never
adopted as a rule by the SEC, Williams's idea did seem to have a profound
effect on the composition of boards. A dramatic shift took place between
1970 and 1980 (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., 1979, 1980; Herman, 1981;
Korn/Ferry International, 1981; National Association of Corporate Directors,
1982; Securities and Exchange Commission, 1980; Smith, 1978; Vance, 1983).
One report that surveyed 1,300 large firms found an increase in the percentage of outsider representation from 59.6 percent in 1971 to 65.9 percent in
1979, and in a 1981 update of the study, the percentage climbed to an even
higher 72.2 percent (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., 1979, 1981). In still another

study examining 887 firms, 71 percent of the directors were outsiders

(National Association of Corporate Directors, 1982).
In recent years, efforts to bolster the position of outsiders on corporate

boards have continued. The stock exchanges and the SEC have adopted a
number of new rules and regulations regarding board committees. For
example, the SEC, NYSE, ASE, and National Association of Securities Dealers all advocate that outsiders should represent a significant portion of the

membership of audit committees. In fact, the NYSE, which has the most
stringent regulations of these groups, insists that all firms listed on the
exchange must maintain an audit committee "comprised solely of directors

independent of management and free from any relationship that... would
interfere with the exercise of independent judgment" (National Association
of Corporate Directors, 1982: 46).
The SEC appears to agree with the NYSE's position, noting that having
an audit committee whose members have vested interests related to those of

management may be worse than having no audit committee at all, because a
firm thus creates the appearance of having an effective body, but it in fact

lacks substance (Securities and Exchange Commission, 1980). According to

these regulators, the sensitive nature of such a committee's monitoring tasks
makes it unlikely that insiders can maintain the needed independence. The
duties and responsibilities of other groups, such as compensation and nominating committees, also illustrate why many boards strive for, if not require,
outside dominance on key committees.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Although the outsider dominance perspective has been

the 1960s, and the subject of numerous rules and regulations,
surprisingly little empirical research on the topic. Of the few

have been conducted, virtually all have used the performan
their dependent variable (Schmidt, 1975; Smith, 1978; Van

Moreover, their findings have been mixed. In fact, in many o
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high proportions of insiders, not outsiders, are associated with high levels of
performance (e.g., Vance, 1955, 1965), and thus their conclusions oppose the

outsider dominance perspective and prevailing business sentiment.
Although these findings may appear perplexing to some advocates of

outsider dominance, others might question if these empirical studies have in
fact captured the true question. After all, critics and supporters alike acknowl-

edge that a board's role is to monitor and evaluate a firm and its top
management. If directors affect the operations and performance of a company,
it is only indirectly, through such acts as the hiring or firing of CEOs. Most
advocates of boardroom reform readily acknowledge that it is not a board's
responsibility to serve in an operating or functional capacity (Herman, 1981;
Vance, 1983).
Issues of legality appear to be an area over which boards have more direct control and interest (Mueller, 1979). Thus, an important test of the outsider dominance perspective might be to examine the relationship between

board composition and a firm's involvement in illegal activities. Since
boards of directors are legally responsible (Committee on Corporate Laws,
1976), its members may be more likely to monitor their firm's actions to
insure that management is not acting illegally than they are to monitor func-

tional operations in general. Although directors might not know about a
firm's involvement in illegal actions, ignorance of such matters places them
in a very precarious, and possibly severely damaging, legal position.
This research question, which is substantially different from previous

tests of the outsider dominance perspective, may help to clarify earlier

findings. Rather than suggesting that outsiders strengthen firms through positive effects on certain outcome or dependent variables like overall performance, this study considers whether outsiders strengthen firms by preventing certain negative actions, specifically, illegal activities.

Hypothesis 1: There is an inverse relationship between
the proportion of outsiders on its board and the number of
illegal acts committed by a firm.
This first hypothesis suggests that although both insiders and outsiders
might be aware of a firm's involvement, or planned involvement, in illegal

actions, insiders, because of their subordinate position, are less likely to
speak up against management and a CEO/chairman despite sharing legal
accountability. Outsiders, who do not work daily under the CEO, may be

more likely to bring such actions to the attention of other board members and
to object to the firm's planned or actual involvement.

Although Hypothesis 1 addresses the direct relationship between the
proportion of outsiders and a firm's involvement in illegal actions, it does
not consider a simple majority effect. The key issue may not be the number
or percentage of outsiders, but whether outside directors represent a minority or a majority. In the first case, the outsiders may choose to remain silent,
not voicing concerns over the legality of certain actions or questioning the
CEO; in the second, they might be more willing to speak up.
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Hypothesis 2: Firms with a majority of outsiders on their
boards will engage in fewer illegal acts than those firms
with a majority of insiders on their boards.
These two hypotheses address the basic relationship between board struc-

ture and illegal acts, but neither considers the possibility of a causal lag

whereby earlier illegal acts have lead to changes in board structure. After a
firm's involvement in illegal acts, its board as a whole may seek to strengthen
outside representation in an effort to improve its monitoring function and
enhance stockholders' confidence. Altering a group's composition is a means
to reassure various regulatory agencies and key constituents that a board
intends to make changes so that this type of involvement will no longer be
tolerated. Even if no actual modifications of the roles, responsibilities, and

conduct of board members occur, a change in composition can serve as a
symbolic action, signaling that the board will no longer condone such
activities; in some respects such a change resembles the ritual scapegoating often described in the literature on executive succession (Brown, 1982
Eitzen & Yetman, 1972; Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Lieberson & O'Connor,

1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This notion that board composition and
corporate illegal activities may be causally linked suggests that:
Hypothesis 3: The greater a firm's involvement in illegal
activities, the more likely it is to increase the proportion
of outside directors on its board.
Finally, given earlier arguments concerning the conflict of interests that
might result when CEOs simultaneously serve as board chairmen, we suggest:

Hypothesis 4: Firms with a single individual serving in

the roles of CEO and chairman are more likely to commit
illegal acts than firms with two separate individuals serving in these roles.
RESEARCH DESIGN

The objective of this research was to test the relationship b
composition and the occurrence of illegal corporate acts. The p
used included all companies continuously listed on the Fortune
the years 1980 and 1984 (N= 384). Most firms that were dropped
during this period were objects of corporate mergers and acqu
and Szwajkowski (1975) provided information about types of il
committed by these firms and Trade Cases (Commerce Clearin
1980-84) provided information concerning involvement in lega
able activities. This publication reports decisions and consen
decrees entered in federal and state courts for cases involving

tions of antitrust laws and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

As did Staw and Szwajkowski (1975), we considered these areas of
litigation: price discrimination, tying arrangements, refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, franchise violation, price fixing, foreclosure of entry, reciprocity

allocation of markets, monopoly, conspiracy, and illegal mergers and
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acquisitions. We also used the same criteria, with the dependent variable
represented by the total number of instances in which firms were found
guilty in litigated cases, were parties to nonlitigated consent decrees, or
involved in unsettled cases in which the court found substantial merit to the

charges against the cited firms.
Our classification of board members as insiders or outsiders also fol-

lowed previous research (Pfeffer, 1972; Schmidt, 1975; Vance, 1964

considered current or retired managers of an organization or of one o
subsidiaries to be inside directors. Outside directors did not currently
nor had they previously held, management positions within the comp
which they were serving as director. Consulting Standard & Poor's Regi
Corporations (1981-85), which lists directors either as members of ma
ment or outsiders, we divided the numbers of outside members by th
numbers of directors to obtain a proportion for each firm. However,

these data are longitudinal, and slight changes in board compositio
common from year to year, it was necessary to average percentages of

ers from 1980 to 1984.1 Thus, the proportion of outsiders represe

average proportion for each firm during the five years under investi
For Hypothesis 2, the independent variable is binary, so we used a
variable, with firms having a majority (> 50%) of outsiders on their b
coded 1, and firms where outsiders were a minority coded 0 (Schmidt,
1975).

Finally, to test Hypothesis 4, we needed to distinguish firms with a
single individual serving as both CEO and chairman from those firms in

which separate individuals held these positions. Once again, the relevant
information was in Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations (1981-85).
We compared names and titles to determine whether there was dual or
separate leadership between 1980 and 1984. As might be expected, changes
took place over time, with firms going from separate to dual leadership, or
vice versa. Thus, in an effort to remain as conservative as possible, we used
for further analysis only those firms that consistently maintained either dual
or separate status throughout the relevant dates (N = 274).
RESULTS

For the companies in our population, the average number
between 1980 and 1984 ranged from a high of 40 to a low of 5 (x
proportion of outsiders to total directors ranged from a high of 1
12 percent, with the mean at 70 percent. The last figure is simil
estimates regarding percentages of outsiders (Heidrick & Struggle
Korn/Ferry International, 1981; National Association of Corporat
1982). The numbers of illegal acts over the period ranged from a

to a low of 0. Although the mean for all firms was less than

mean for those firms that were involved in some type of illegal

3. The numbers of firms with consistent dual and separate l
1 We divided the proportion for each year by the number of years.
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throughout the period were 245 and 29, respectively. Thus, for those firms

that maintained a consistent leadership status, 89 percent had single individuals serving in the roles of CEO and chairman, a figure consistent with
earlier findings (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., 1981; National Association of
Corporate Directors, 1982).
Results offered no support for Hypothesis 1. The proportion of outsiders
was not significantly related to the number of illegal acts (r = -.012, n.s.).
Similarly, the results of a one-way analysis of variance indicated no significant relationship consistent with Hypothesis 2 (F = .07, n.s.). Firms with a

majority of outsiders were not involved in fewer illegal acts than those
represented by a majority of insiders.

After these initial analyses, we considered two additional variables,
organizational size and governmental regulation, either of which could have

a substantial effect on the relationship under investigation. For example,
some industries, such as defense, broadcasting, and oil and gas, are subject
to greater regulation than others; this may, in turn, influence the number of
illegal acts in which they are involved. We use partial correlation to control
for size, measured in terms of firms' assets, and governmental regulation of
industries defined as high or low, depending on the number of federal agencies monitoring the activities of the industry. Despite this additional control,

the overall results remained the same (r = -.010, n.s.).
Although no significant relationship was found when illegal acts were

assessed in the aggregate over time, it is possible, as Hypothesis 3 suggests,

that previous commission of illegal acts may have lead to changes in the
structures of boards. In particular, the boards of firms that have been exposed
to prosecution for illegal acts may recruit more outsiders to improve monitoring and enhance stockholders' confidence. To test this causal lag, we divided

the years under examination into two equal periods-1980 to the second
quarter of 1982, and the third quarter of 1982 to 1984--and calculated both

the numbers of illegal acts and the percentages of outsiders on boards of

directors for each subperiod. We then modeled the possible causal determinants of board structure as a series of regression equations.

TABLE 1

Correlations Between Proportion of Outside Directors
and Number of Illegal Actsa
Proportion of Majority of Number of
Outside Directors Outside Directors Illegal Acts
Proportion of outside directors - .650*** -.012
Majority of outside directors .013
a N=384
* p < .05

** p < .01
*** p < .001

Academy of Management Journal

796

December

Figure 1 displays the results of these analyses, and Table 2 presents the
detailed results of the regression equations. The findings indicate that both
board structure and the commission of illegal acts were consistent over time.
No support emerged for the proposition that commission of illegal acts leads
to changes in the structures of boards, either directly or indirectly. Similarly,
there is no evidence that board structure directly or indirectly leads to the
commission of illegal acts.
Finally, one-way analysis of variance was used to test Hypothesis 4. The
results indicate that firms where one individual serves as both CEO and

chairman are no more likely to be associated with illegal acts than th
firms in which separate individuals hold these positions (F = 1.82, n.s
DISCUSSION

The results of this investigation are important for severa
this work adds to the existing research, much of which has f

the outsider dominance perspective (Schmidt, 1975; Vanc

The findings of this study do not suggest that adding outsid
boards will lessen a firm's involvement in illegal activities. Si
no evidence that firms dominated by outsiders are more like

illegal acts. In addition, this study represents a novel test

FIGURE 1

Board Composition and Illegal Acts,
Cross-Lagged Panel Analysisa

Percentage .71 * * Percentage

of

outsiders

1980

-.008

Illegal

outsiders

1984

.042

acts

1980-82

of

-.05

Illegal

.25**

acts

1982-84

aIllegal
acts
1980-82
ref
the
second
quarter
of
19
third
quarter
of
1982
an
cients
(,'s).
* p < .05

** p < .01
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TABLE 2

Results of Regression Analysis
of Determinants of Illegal Acts and Board Composition
Percentage
Percentage
of

of Numbers of Illegal Acts

Outsiders, 1984 1980 1984

Independent
Percentages
1980

.680

Variables

of

t

-.006

-.16

-.49

1984

R2
F

.003

.003

t

.13

.97

.21

-.75

Numbers
1980

,

outsiders

19.80**

1984

t

.19

of

5.10**

-.75

.51

.0001

131.18

.03

.06

8.67

* p < .05
** p < .01

dominance perspective. Previous examinations of this issue have focused

the relationship between board composition and performance, addre

the question of whether outsiders have a positive effect on firms by stre
ening positive outcomes. This study, however, approached the issue from
different perspective, asking if outsiders help to minimize or prevent c

tain negative outcomes. Taken together, the results of these two ty

studies lead us to question whether the objectives of outsider dominance
conceptual arguments for this strategy, are legitimate. The evidence to
does not seem to support the belief that stockholders are better served
boards dominated by outsiders.

For the most part, the outsider dominance perspective has rema
unchallenged since its conception over 20 years ago. Moreover, give

recent and rather dramatic increase in criticism of corporate boards, it

been the basis of a highly recommended strategy for improving p

boardroom processes and enhancing stockholder representation. This stu
however, raises questions as to whether this method of reform reaches d
ends.

In the future, researchers may want to investigate what types of boardroom

reforms will improve corporate performance and reduce firms' involvement in illegal activities. These reforms might include placing greater attention on such background characteristics of directors as their experience and
education, or focusing on their financial involvement in a company, such as
stock ownership. Still other research efforts might examine the roles of board
committees in efforts to improve the monitoring function of directors and
reduce involvement in illegal actions. In sum, despite the popularity of the
idea of outsider dominance and its adoption as the basis of certain rules and
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regulations of various government agencies and stock exchanges like the
SEC, NYSE, and ASE, the findings of this and prior studies suggest that we
should reexamine this approach to boardroom reform.
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